The causes of the French Army defeat at Dien Bien Phu: the perspective from the artillery

Abstract

The 1954 Victory of Dien Bien Phu was a momentous event with the profound international influence. The French military’s defeat at Dien Bien Phu stemmed from multiple causes. Adopting the historical method, logical reasoning, and comparative analysis of collected documents, the article aims to provide an additional perspective from the Vietnamese artillery to explain the causes of the French Army’s failure while highlighting the decisive role of artillery in the Vietnamese Army’s triumph. The article points out that an incomplete assessment of the battlefield situation resulted in overconfidence in the planning and execution of defensive strategies by the French military commanders in general, and by the commanders of the French artillery forces in particular, which left the French artillery at Dien Bien Phu inadequately prepared to respond effectively to unexpected developments. Furthermore, the severe organizational and logistical shortcomings further weakened the strength of the French artillery, making them unable to effectively deal with the challenges on the battlefield. On the other hand, the Vietnamese soldiers showed their unwavering determination, strategic acumen, flexible adaptability to adverse conditions, and meticulous preparation of their artillery. The article concludes that artillery was not merely a strategic weapon but also a symbol of creativity and ingenuity of the Vietnamese Army, playing a pivotal role in securing this historic victory.